The Legend of the Colt 45 Calibe

Photo courtesy of http://www.sight1911.com. Tausug kris from author's collection

One time in the 1960’s, waiting for a flight out of Zamboanga airport on the island of Mindanao, I was approached by a grizzled and somewhat scary looking Moro. A colorful and garrulous old fellow, he proceeded to regale me with tales of his time as a guerrilla warrior in World War II against the Japanese. Without my asking, he pulled up his shirt and pant legs to show me the bullet wounds he had survived, more than half a dozen. When I marveled at his ability to sustain such damage, he proudly boasted in broken English, “Well you know, we were the people your Army had to invent the .45 automatic for!” Whenever anyone finds out I have written a history of the Americans and the Moros, I often hear a similar comment, “When I was in the service I heard that the Colt .45 automatic pistol was invented to stop the fanatical Moros from cutting down our soldiers in the Philippine Islands. Is it true?”

The short answer is, “Yes and no.” Yes, the American experience in fighting the Moros was the primary motivator for the “invention” of the weapon, or more precisely, its development. As a result from 1911 until 1985, the Colt Model 1911, .45 caliber automatic pistol went on to become the official sidearm of the U.S. military and one of the most widely-used and famous pistols in military history. That part of the legend is accurate. But did it “stop” the Moros in their tracks? No. Not because it could not. The surprising fact is that Colt .45 M1911 was never used by the U.S. Army for its original, most urgent purpose, that of "stopping the Moros." Why?

But first, let me insert a short disclaimer. This is an article about what is fact and what is myth behind a popular legend that surrounds the Colt .45 M1911. It is not about the weapon per se. To learn more about this famous sidearm, including its technical aspects, the history of its development, and well-known heroes and desperados who used it, I recommend clicking on the following link, http://www.sightm1911.com/.

In the late 19th century, the U.S. Army’s Bureau of Ordinance, the U.S. Navy, and the Marines adopted the Colt Model 1894 .38 caliber double-action (DA) revolver as the standard sidearm for officers, commissioned and non-commissioned (except corporals). Between 1894 and 1900, both services purchased a total of 144,000 of these handguns for use by the Army and the state National Guards and militias. The six-shot Colt .38 DA was on the cutting edge of late 19th century firearms technology and replaced the famous Colt .45 caliber “Peacemaker”. The principle draw back of the old-yet-reliable Peacemaker was that it was a single-action revolver, meaning it had to be cocked by hand or thumb between each shot. The lack of an adequate safety also meant that it was usually loaded with only five cartridges rather than six, best carried with an empty chamber in the firing position. But, despite the modernity and elegance of the new Colt .38, it was never embraced by the small, Regular “frontier” Army (less than 28,000 men) because of serious doubts about the efficacy of its smaller caliber.

The first test of the Colt .38 came with Spanish-American War of April to August, 1898, whose single land battle was fought in Cuba. But that conflict, with only two-days of actual combat, was far too short to provide any reasonable conclusion. However, the far more deadly and extended conflict which came out of that war, the Philippine-American War (known then as the Philippine Insurrection) soon proved that the fears about the smaller caliber had been entirely justified. In contrast to the Spanish-American War, one of the shortest conflicts in this nation’s history, the Philippine-American War lasted almost as long as World War II, from February, 1899 to July 4, 1902. It began as a “conventional” war but before its first year ended had morphed into a guerrilla war; in fact being the first of its kind and setting the pattern for the many “wars of national liberation” that would become a hallmark of the mid-20th century. It was what we would term today an “asymmetric” contest. It was also the U.S. Army’s first experience with jungle warfare and fighting against a full-blown insurgency in a foreign land.

The Filipino “Army of Liberation” (solely drawn from the northern Christian provinces of the islands) was poorly armed, with only about one rifle for every three-to-four of its soldiers. An even bigger problem for the rebels was lack of ammunition; due to lack of funds and the efficiency of the U.S. Navy in catching and deterring gun-runners. The Army of Liberation generally had to rely on making its own bullets, using home-made black powder and brass curtain rods. Many U.S. historians have belittled the military ability and leadership of the Army of Liberation, comparing it unfavorably to the Viet Minh and Viet Cong of more than fifty years later. But the fact is the Filipinos were as motivated, tough, and potentially as deadly as the Vietnamese, but unlike the NVA and Viet Cong they did not have the relative luxury of an unlimited stream of modern weapons, abundant ammunition, and foreign trainers, all provided gratis by a friendly superpower (the USSR). Otherwise there might have been a far different outcome. Even then 4,234 Americans killed out of 126,468 “cycled through” gave that war the dubious distinction of having one of the higher “death rates” for American wars, that is troops committed to troops dying, half-again higher than the decade-long Vietnam War (See “McKinley’s Ghost” on this web site.)

Like all good guerilla fighters, the Filipinos were improvisers. They took advantage of the tropical topography with its exceptionally high grasses (well over six feet tall), dense jungles, and winding, constricted trails, to mount ambushes using a tactic called “the bolo rush”. The Philippine bolo is a fearsome, short (16” to 18”), single-edged, razor-sharp cutting weapon. Every farmer had one and knew how to use it, whether for harvesting crops, hacking trails through jungle, or taking off a limb in a fight. A large force, often 100-200 “bolo men” would lie hidden near a trail. When a smaller American patrol came along in single-file, Filipino snipers would fire, forcing them to drop for cover. At a signal, the bolo men would rush the soldiers lying prone on the trail, inevitably losing many in their ranks to rifle fire but occasionally overwhelming the Americans with their sheer numbers and the ferocity of the charge. Commissioned officers and sergeants, armed only with the Colt .38 revolver, were a primary target.

Think about it! There you are, suddenly sprawled in the mud of a narrow jungle trail, scared as hell, hearing the thud of hundreds of feet and screams in a language you don’t understand. You can’t see more than a few feet because of the thick grass and vegetation. Suddenly several blurry shapes are running towards you. And all you have in your hands is this “little popgun”. It is not a question of getting off a quick shot or two. With the Colt .38, if you did not hit each attacker in a vital part, the head or heart, the bullet would go right through the man. For the attacker it was a terrible, sharp pain but a small, clean hole that would not slow his momentum. For you it could mean death in a few seconds. Understandably there was major anger from men in the field over the inadequacy of the Colt .38 (and sometimes the limited stopping power of the otherwise excellent Krag 30-40 rifle).

Complaints were made to the Army’s Bureau of Ordinance, who made the decisions on which weapons were used and supported and which were not. But while there was a lot of discussion, essentially nothing was done. Two years later, by early 1902, the war had taken a sharp turn in favor of the Americans, as province-by-province, guerilla commanders began to surrender. The pressure to address the sidearm problem notably diminished. But then unexpectedly, far to the south on the island of Mindanao, a major battle took place between the Americans and the Muslim Moros of the southern islands on May 2, 1902, just as the conflict in the northern islands neared an end.

American garrisons in “Moroland”, the lands controlled by the twelve Muslim societies collectively known as the Moros, had existed in the southern Philippines for three years. Surprisingly, it had been a negotiated, amicable, and nearly incident-free occupation. But in early 1902, a decision was made to extend the American occupation to the remote but densely-populated high plain of Lake Lanao on the island of Mindanao. The field commander on Mindanao was Colonel Frank Baldwin, a Civil War and Indian Wars veteran who had the unique distinction of having twice been awarded the Medal of Honor. But, while a soldier’s soldier, Baldwin regularly disobeyed orders and deliberately baited the Moros into a battle he easily could have lost, deep in their territory. Starting with nearly 2,000 men, Baldwin pushed through narrow jungle trails up into the rugged, forbidding interior of Mindanao so far and so fast that he was left with a remaining assault force of only 400 riflemen of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (he had been forced to leave his artillery behind and many infantrymen had dropped out of the column from heat prostration). Baldwin had outrun his supply lines and reserve, landing right in the middle of nearly 75,000 Moros, the Maguindanaos, who had successfully stood off the Spanish for over 300 years.

Fortunately for Baldwin in his first major encounter he was met by only between 300-500 Moros defending two forts (called cottas) on a high, open plain just above the lake at a place called Bayan. The 27th Infantry easily took the lightly-defended first fort and steadily approached the walls of the second fort, keeping up a steady fire on its defenders. But here things went terribly awry. The Americans had nearly exhausted their ammunition in a slow advance and were forced to fix bayonets. Waves of Maguindanao warriors sprung from hiding in nearby trenches while others poured over the cotta walls, swinging their terrifying double-edged short swords; the double-handled kampilan, the short barong, and the most lethal, the wavy kris. In close quarters, failing light, and with precious little ammunition, the American’s overwhelming advantage in firepower disappeared. Two years later, a former Medal of Honor winner and veteran of the Moro Campaigns, Capt. C.C. Smith, lamented, “in hand-to-hand combat our soldiers are no match for the Moro. If our first shot misses the target, we rarely have time to get off another.” In a matter of minutes, Company F of the 27th (about 100 men total) lost both its officers and nearly half its men to the flashing blades and rifle fire from atop the parapets. They were only saved from annihilation by a sudden, obscuring fog that propitiously came from off the lake accompanied by a drenching downpour. However to the surprise of the Americans, the next morning the fort hoisted a flag of surrender, although it soon became apparent that a large number had escaped during the night. The four war leaders, including the Sultan of Bayan, who had been at the front of their men, had been killed or died from wounds. The U.S. attacking force, about 300 men in total, had taken nearly 25% casualties even though spared making a final assault.

In conversations with the men who had fought the "Battle of Bayan", Major General Adna Chaffee, overall commander of American forces in the Philippines, concluded that while demonstrating personal bravery, Col. Baldwin had been headstrong, reckless, and dangerously close to duplicating the fate of a well-known soldier both had served beside in the Civil War, George Armstrong Custer. The War Department trumpeted the Battle of Bayan as a glorious victory, one that had administered a “salutary lesson” to the Moros. But Chaffee knew much better. He forbade Baldwin from continuing his advance and took drastic action to prevent a reoccurrence. Baldwin was promoted up and out (later becoming a Brigadier General), and amidst howls of protest within the Army, Chaffee gave most of Baldwin’s command over to a heretofore 41-year old, obscure junior officer, Capt. John J. Pershing. Pershing was one of only two officers in his entire command who had any prior experience with the Moros, plus he had learned to speak the Maguindanao dialect and had formed personal relationships with some of the key Datus (chieftains). Chaffee, took the risky step of reaching down the ladder, bypassing many a field-grade officer, for a man he believed could think as well as fight. In his subsequent pacification campaigns of 1902-03, Pershing proved Chaffee's judgment right. But, having a competent commander was only part of the solution, and Chaffee addressed the weapons issue as well. In his Annual Report to the War Department for 1902, an important document addressed to Congress and minutely examined by the press, Chaffee placed on the record, “Complaints have been made by the officers in the Lake Lanao Expedition that the 38 caliber Colt is too light; that it failed to stop Moros unless it struck them in a vital spot.” He made it clear he expected immediate action by the War Department on the matter.

This had been preceded by a flurry of letters and face-to-face conversations within the Army, the War Department and the Bureau of Ordinance, often in much stronger and saltier language, about the inadequacies of the .38 Colt revolver and the urgent need for a better weapon. One story in particular was told time and time again of an incident during one Pershing's expeditions which became emblematic of the new danger faced.

Perhaps the most dramatic moment of the Maciu campaign came when two infantry companies were carefully advancing toward a cotta through the six-foot-high cogon grass. Suddenly, a powerfully built Moro jumped from hiding and charged, swinging a kampilan (a long, double-edged, two-handed sword) like a scythe. He nearly lopped off the arm of one scout before charging into the main skirmish line of men some 30–40 yards away. It took seven bullets to his torso to finally stop him dead in his tracks. The attacker turned out to be Sultan Cabugatan of Maciu. Pershing noted in tribute that he was “the last of a long line who had always fought the Christians. He had held out against us, I think, purely as a matter of principle and he vindicated his courage in his death.[1]

As the Moro Campaigns were prosecuted between 1903-1913, dozens of such stories surfaced. One of the most famous of the resisting Moros, Panglima Hassan a Tausug war leader, was cornered and refused to surrender. Hassan rushed the American line with only his barong, gravely wounding a soldier and two officers. "It was determined that thirty-two Krag bullets hit Hassan before a last bullet from a sergeant's revolver [an old Peacemaker] plugged him dead between the eyes." [2] It was asserted in newspapers that the Moros were "hopped up" on drugs and wore bamboo armor and old Spanish helmets for protection during these charges, but this was totally false. The Americans facing the Moros realized that they were up against a warrior culture, not unlike the Indians tribes of the Great Plains; surrender was considered humiliation and their values did not permit them to be afraid of death, in fact, it was often embraced. Their religion told them they would be granted instant entry to heaven if they died in battle defending their faith against kafirs (non-believers). Worse, they were simply tough as nails and reveled in personal combat.

Finally under new pressure, the Bureau of Ordinance began looking for a replacement for the Colt .38. The Bureau had been preoccupied with replacing the 30-40 Krag with a new high-powered rifle identical to the German Mauser. This would become the 1903 Springfield that American doughboys would carry into World War I. (However, troops in the Philippines would not get the new rifle until 1907.) Somewhat enamored with German weapons, the Bureau procured 2,000 new, technologically-advanced, 9mm German Luger semi-automatic pistols and shipped them to the Philippines. However, as noted with some sarcasm in the June, 1903 Annual Report of Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner, the commander of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu,

The Luger automatic pistol as a hunting pistol and for dress occasions is attractive and useful. I have one which I prize highly, but for field service, in the hands of officers and men, it is a failure. It is too complicated, and cartridges often jam, but the main defect is that the bullet will not stop a Moro.

But because of inter-Army politics, Sumner did not put into his report an embarrassing fact for the Army. Someone else, worse a civilian organization, had already come up with the solution to the Army’s problem; and it was “off-the-shelf” and immediately available.

For the first two years of the American presence in the Philippines, the territory was kept under martial law. The commander of the U.S. Army in the islands was also its Military Governor. By mid-1901, due to the progression of the Philippine-American War, that territory had come to encompass most of the islands. President William McKinley abolished the office of Military Governor and replaced it with a civil government headed by a civilian Governor General, William Howard Taft. In a move strongly resisted by the U.S. Army at all levels, Vice Governor Luke Wright immediately created a new paramilitary organization to take over responsibility for establishing law and order in the recently conquered but still very restive provinces. Wright had been in the Philippines for two years as a member of the Philippine Commission, a civilian oversight board. He was the only southerner and former Confederate Army member of a board entirely composed of Yankees. Wright was not especially overawed by Army generals, all of whom had served with the Union. The model for his new organization was the Texas Rangers, a law enforcement agency fashioned along the lines of strict military discipline but capable of operating in highly dispersed, semi-autonomous fashion. It was to be composed of Filipino constables and led by American officers. Wright petitioned the War Department to provide Army officers for the new organization, particularly since with the winding down of the war there was a surplus. But the Army command strongly resisted and when further pressured only grudgingly provided four officers from among its many Captains and Majors to command the new organization. Even then, the four reassigned Army officers had been singled out as troublemakers by their superiors, although their real sins had been in being too openly vocal in criticizing the top brass for their uneven counterinsurgency tactics and lax discipline towards instances of looting, torture, and civilian abuse.

Wright responded by offering immediate commissions to the large number of enlisted Army non-coms about to be mustered out of the many volunteer regiments heading back to the U.S. He also recruited many junior officers from the large foreign contingents in nearby China fighting the Boxer Rebellion and opened up commissions to qualified Filipinos. The Philippine Constabulary would become a virtual American foreign legion. Their Army equivalents generally looked down upon them as inferiors, prompting Constabulary officers to prove they could be smarter, tougher, and more effective. A strong argument can be made from their subsequent performance that the Constabulary was the spiritual, if not the institutional, ancestor of today’s Army Special Forces.

The man picked to head up the Philippine Constabulary was Captain Henry T. Allen, given the temporary rank of Brigadier General. Considered by some as insubordinate and overly self-righteous, Allen had nevertheless been an effective unit commander and pioneer in employing civic-action along with military operations in fighting the northern Filipino “insurrectos.” When it came to weaponry for his new force, Allen was determined to chart a course different from the Army, and he was in a unique position to do something about it. The Constabulary reported to the civilian Governor General William Howard Taft, who in turn reported directly to the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, as did General Chaffee, but through a different route. Theoretically Taft and Chaffee were equals, but Taft had abundant political and personal clout with the new President, Theodore Roosevelt, which Chaffee did not. Taft successfully pressured Root to order the Bureau of Ordinance to give Allen whatever he wanted, and Allen had already picked out his weapons. He wanted a new, improved version of the Army’s then obsolete double-action Colt .45, M1878 “Frontier” revolver, but one modified to fire a higher-velocity cartridge. Several months later, he got it, the 45 caliber Colt Model 1902 revolver, which came to be unofficially known as the “Philippine” (and "Alaskan") model. 2,000 were purchased by the Bureau of Ordinance and shipped to the Philippines, solely for Constabulary use. Allen had another simple demand that would also provide the Army with a lesson, 2,000 Winchester 97, 12-gauge, pump-action, repeating shotguns with extra short, “sawed-off” barrels. However, the Army did prevent him from equipping his Filipino constables with the 30-40 Krag. Instead he had to settle for the ancient single-shot Remington carbines left over from the volunteer regiments.

Photo Colt .45 DA "Philippine" (a.k.a. "Alaskan") revolver courtesy O.C. Young, www.ocyoung.com. Photo on right is of a 2nd Lt. of the Moro Constabulary, ca 1912, in the field. The Constabulary swore by the Colt M1902 for jungle fighting, as it did the Winchester pump-action shotgun . They saved many a life. An unresolved question has always surrounded the "Philippine" Colt among collectors as to the reason for its enlarged trigger and trigger guard. The most probable explanation appears to be increased leverage from a longer trigger in order to enable a stiffer mainspring for firing the higher velocity cartridge that Allen had specified.[3] The Constabulary also had its own special holster and cartridge belt, distinctly different from the one worn by the Army. Open rather than with a flap closure, it was made to be worn on the hip rather than waist. This may reflect their frontier heritage. The shotguns were supplied with metallic cartridges rather than paper due to the high humidity found in the Philippines.

Meanwhile for the Army, it was not until more than a year later, October of 1903, that a new Chief of Ordinance, Brigadier General William Crozier, issued orders to his department to “solve the caliber problem.” But, for whatever reason, the Bureau of Ordinance continued to turn a deaf ear to the demands for immediate relief and simply ignored the comparative field test laboratory that had been created by introduction of the "Philippine" revolver—whether out of pique, since it had been forced upon them, or out of a bad case of “not invented here.” Ordinance stubbornly took and held to the position that the only viable solution was advanced technology, and promptly issued a challenge to firearms manufacturers to compete to supply an all new, advanced .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol.

In mid-1903, the Philippine Constabulary extended its jurisdiction to the lands occupied by the Moros, forming a new subsidiary organization, the Moro Constabulary. In early 1904 it fought side-by side with the U.S. Army serving as scouts against in a number of campaigns. In the field, each Constabulary non-com carried a Winchester shotgun and each officer the Model 1902 Colt .45 revolver. At their option, each officer could also draw a Winchester shotgun. Army officers and non-coms could only look on in envy. The comparative results were obvious. In his Annual Report of June, 1904, General Leonard Wood stated what he thought was apparent to anyone paying attention,

It is thought the caliber revolver [meaning the Model 1902] is the one which should be issued to troops throughout the Army…. Instances have repeatedly been reported during the past year where natives have been shot through and through several times with a .38 caliber revolver, and have come on, cutting up the unfortunate individual armed with it…. The .45 caliber revolver stops a man in his tracks, usually knocking him down…. It is recommended that each company serving in this department be furnished with four 12-gauge Winchester, repeating shotguns. For outpost duty and advance guard [walking point]… there is no weapon in our possession equal to the shotgun loaded with buckshot.

Sadly, another six years passed without action. The next five Annual Reports to the War Department simply repeated verbatim the prior year laments and urgent requests for double-action, .45 caliber revolvers and Winchester shotguns. In the meantime, letters from officers in the field to their compatriots in U.S. regiments urged that, if assigned to Moroland, they buy the revolvers and shotguns on their own account. Major Hugh Scott, a veteran of the wars with the Sioux and Apaches, heeded the advice and arrived with both, as did many others, and did not regret it. But the real burden fell to the sergeants, who seldom could not afford such an expenditure on their meager pay. Quite a few scrounged an old Peacemaker to include in their duffel.

In 1908, the Bureau of Ordinance finally relented and began equipping regiments heading towards Moroland with .45 caliber revolvers. An improved “new service” model by Colt, it was similar to but a much heavier duty version of the Colt .38. In 1910, now a Brigadier General in command of Moro Province, John J. Pershing gave a mild pat on the back for something that should have been done many years earlier, “The substitution of the .45 caliber Colt’s revolver for the caliber .38 is a distinct improvement. This kind of gun more than compensates for the extra weight.” In March of 1911 the Colt .45 Model 1911 was selected as the official sidearm of the armed forces of the United States but would not be put into production for another year. The policy was not to swap out weapons with units in the field, and it would not be issued to regiments destined for the Philippines until mid-1913.
However by then, the U.S. Army was gone from the Land of the Moros. Over a three-year period, from 1910 to early 1913, the US Army presence on the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu had been steadily drawn down to zero, entirely replaced by a smaller number of Philippine Constabulary who were “backed up” by garrisons of the Philippine Scouts, the Army’s own “native troops” led by regular Army officers. The Constabulary continued to use the Colt .45 Model 1902 revolver together with pump-action Winchester shotguns (satisfactorily) right up until World War II while Scout officers carried the Model 1909 revolver. In a bit of irony, rather than being used for their original stated purpose, to “stop the Moros”, the first Colt .45 M1911 semi-automatic pistols were finally shipped to “Moroland” in 1944-45, by submarine from Australia together with .45 caliber Thompson sub-machineguns, to provide Moro guerillas the firepower needed to stop Japanese Banzai charges.

[1] Robert A. Fulton, MOROLAND 1899 – 1906: America’s First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society, (Bend, OR: Tumalo Creek Press, 2007) 151.

[2] Ibid., 250.

[3] John Potocki, The Colt Model 1905 Automatic Pistol, (Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray Publishing, 1998).